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LETTERS  TO  THE  EDITOR 
A  Note  on  Evolutionary  Stable  Strategies 
and  Game  Dynamics 
In  1974  J.  Maynard  Smith  introduced  the  fundamental  notion  of  an 
evolutionarily  stable  strategy  (ESS)  in  order  to  explain  the  evolution  of 
genetically  determined  social  behaviour  within  a single  animal  species. If  the 
possible  pure  strategies  for  contests  within  a species  are  1,2,  . . ., ~1, and  if 
A =  (aij)  is  the  payoff  matrix,  then  aij  is  the  payoff  for  the  pure  strategy  i 
played  against  the  pure  strategy  j;  c  aijqj is the  payoff  for the  pure  strategy  i 
against  the mixed  strategy  given  by $ probability  vector  q =  (ql,  . . ., q,,); and 
PAq  =  1  Piaijqj 
i,j 
the  payoff  for  strategy  p =  (pi,  . . ., p,)  played  against  q. Let 
s, = {x = (Xl,  . . .  . xn):Cxj=  1,  xi>0  for  i=  l,...  ,n) 
be  the  simplex  of all  possible  strategies. 
Dl  : (Maynard  Smith,  1974)  A  state  p E S,  is  called  an  ESS  if for  all  q #  p 
either  pAp >  qAp or  pAp  =  qAp  and  pAq >  qAq. 
In  Taylor  &  Jonker  (1978)  the  authors  used  the  fact  that  the  payoff,  in 
animal  contests,  corresponds  “by  definition”  to  the  rate  of increase.  This 
suggests  for  the  investigation  of the  evolution  of behaviour  the  dynamical 
model  given  by 
~i/Xi  =  C  aijxj. 
j 
With  this  equation,  however,  the  strategies  (xi,  . . ., x,)  don’t  remain  on  the 
simplex.  But  since  only  the  differences  in  payoff  are  relevant  for  the  game, 
one  may  consider 
ii/xi  =  c  aijxj-  A, 
j 
where  the  function  A  is  chosen  in  such  a  way  that  1  ii  =  0  whenever 
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c  xi  =  1. This  leads  to  the  equation 
ki  =  Xi(CUijXj-  C  XiUijXj)  i =  1, . . ., n 
j  i,j 
on  the  (invariant)  simplex  S,. 
Having  derived  this  equation,  Taylor  &  Jonker  proceed  to  show,  as their 
main  result,  that  if p is an  ESS  satisfying  a mild  regularity  condition,  then  p is 
an  equilibrium  state  for  (1) which  is strictly  stable  (i.e.  all  eigenvalues  have 
strictly  negative  real  part).  The  converse  is not  valid. 
In  this  note,  we  give  a  simple  characterization  of  ESS  which  implies 
immediately  that  every  ESS  is  an  equilibrium  state  for  (1)  which  is 
asymptotically  stable  (all  orbits  near  p  converge  to  p).  Thus  both  the 
hypothesis  and  the  result  are  slightly  weaker  than  in  Taylor  &  Jonker 
(1978).  We  begin  by  reformulating  Dl. 
D2:  A  state  p E S,  is  called  an  ESS  if for  all  4 E S,  one  has 
provided  s >  0 is  sufficiently  small. 
The  equivalence  of the  two  definitions  is easily  seen since  (2) means 
(l-&)(PAP-qAP)+&(PA4-qAq)  > 0. 
The  interpretation  of D2  is easy : if a mutation  in a population  with  strategy  p 
introduces  a  small  population  with  strategy  4,  then  the  p-population  fares 
better  than  the  q-population  against  the  new  (mixed)  population 
(1 --~)p  +~q.  D2  then  is equivalent  to 
D3:  A  state  p  E S,  is called  an  ESS  if 
pAx  >  XAX 
for  all  x E S,,  x  #  p,  in  a  sufficiently  small  neighbourhood  of p. 
This  follows  by multiplying  (2) by  E and  adding  (1 -  c)pA((  1 -  e)p + ~q)  on 
both  sides. 
Let  us now  use the  fact  that  p is the  unique  maximum  of the  function 
on  S,,  since  the  Lagrange  multiplier  must  be equal  to 
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which  implies  that  the  Xi must  be proportional  (and  hence  equal)  to  the pi,  at 
the  maximum.  The  time  derivative  of P  along  the  orbits  of (1) is 
p  =  T  apI%  . xi  =  P  T  pi(C  UijXj-  C  xiaijxj) 
j  i,j 
=  P(pAx  -  XAX). 
Hence  D3  is  equivalent  to  having  P(x)  >  0  for  all  x  #  p  in  a  small 
neighbourhood  of p.  Thus 
D4:  A  state  p E S,  is an  ESS  if 
v=JJpqi-nx;i 
I  I 
is a strict  local  Ljapunov  function  at  p for  (1). 
As a corollary  of D4,  one  obtains  that  every  ESS  is asymptotically  stable. 
As an example,  we mention  that  for  the case of the  “4hypercycle”,  where 
[ 
0  k,  0  0 




0  0  0  k, 
k,  0  0  0 1 
(with  ki >  0)  the  unique  equilibrium  in  the  interior  of S,  is  always  globally 
stable;  the  function  V is a Ljapunov  function  if all  ki are equal,  but  it  is never 
a strict  Ljapunov  function.  For  the  “3-hypercycle”,  the  equilibrium  is again 
always  a global  attractor,  but  V  is  a (strict)  Ljapunov  function  if  the  three 
constants  A,  Jk,  and  &  satisfy  the  (strict)  triangle  inequality. 
These  examples  imply  that  not  every  asymptotically  stable  equilibrium  is 
an  ESS,  and  that  (as noted  already  by  Haigh  in  an  appendix  to  Maynard 
Smith  (1974)  even  for  II  =  3  there  need  not  be  an  ESS  at  all.  Another 
example  is given  by 
(which  corresponds  to  the  game  of scissors-paper-stone  which  is treated  by a 
different  ecological  model  in  May  &  Leonard  (1975).  Here  p =  (l/3,  l/3,  l/3) 
and  P  =  0 on  S,  (every  orbit  in  the  interior  is periodic). 
Since  there  is nothing  special  about  the  Ljapunov  function  V,  it  could  be 
that  under  certain  circumstances  it  would  be  more  appropriate  to  study 
asymptotically  stable  equilibria  of (l),  rather  than  ESS. 612  J.  HOFBAUER  ET  AL. 
Let  us  mention  finally  that  equation  (l),  and  relatives  of  it,  have  been 
investigated  in  Eigen  (1971),  Eigen  &  Schuster  (1978)  and  Schuster, 
Sigmund,  Wolff  &  Hotbauer  (1978)  in  the  context  of  self organization  of 
macromolecules.  It  seems  interesting  that  the  same  equation  (1)  plays  a 
certain  role  at  the  two  very ends,  so to  speak,  of evolution,  namely  prebiotic 
evolution  and  evolution  of animal  behaviour. 
Recently we  learned that Zeeman had already  obtained  a proof  that every ESS is an 
attractor.  His  result  has  not  been published  yet.  We  would  like  to  thank  Professors 
Maynard  Smith  and  Zeeman  for  helpful  advice  and making  unpublished  material 
available  to  us. 
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